Why policies fail? An institutional model explaining success and failure factors of rural development policies in Europe by Mantino, Francesco
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Why policies fail? An institutional model
explaining success and failure factors of
rural development policies in Europe
Francesco Mantino
National Institute of Agricultural Economics
July 2013
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/50216/
MPRA Paper No. 50216, posted 28. September 2013 04:53 UTC
 XXVth ESRS Congress 
29 July – 1 August 2013 in Florence, Italy 
1 
 
 
Why policies fail? An institutional model 
explaining success and failure factors of rural 
development policies in Europe 
 
Francesco Mantino1 
 
 
Abstract – This paper intends to analyse which are 
the main mechanisms and factors which bring either 
to failure or to success rural development policies. 
This analysis has been done in four Italian regions 
and in five rural areas, in order to catch macro and 
“meso” dimensions of success and failure. This analy-
sis take under consideration governance and rules as 
the main arena where the different stakeholders try 
to impose their influence and interests at stake. Fac-
tors of success and failure operate along the institu-
tional chain starting from the EU to the local level. By 
their collective action they try to shape rules and 
governance structures in relation to the impact they 
perceive on the resource allocation and the transac-
tion costs needed to access to policies.1 
 
INTRODUCTION  
Understanding why policies fail in a multi-
governance context is the main objective of this 
paper. It is a quite difficult task, due to the complex-
ity of the policy process and the multi-actor dimen-
sion of the analysis. Main focus here is on EU Rural 
Development Plans (RDPs), as they have been im-
plemented in Italian regions. Italy is a very emblem-
atic case of multi-level and multi-actor system, not 
only in rural development but also in Cohesion poli-
cies. This work intends to develop an analytical 
framework to represent how interest groups and 
institutions contribute to determine the outcomes of 
RD policies, from the entering into force of EU regu-
lations to the funds’ delivering to rural beneficiaries. 
In this analysis we follow the assumption on the 
fundamental role of institutions in influencing eco-
nomic development (North, 1999; Acemoglu et al, 
2004; Levy and Fukuyama, 2010), with particular 
reference to the role of rules and governance struc-
tures created by the EU policy reform and its con-
crete implementation over time. In other works we 
have already stressed the role of governance (Man-
tino, 2009; Mantino et al, 2009). In this work we 
move further by developing the idea that rules and 
governance determine RD policy failure or success 
via the transaction costs of new policies and the 
reactions of main stakeholders to the transaction 
costs (North, 1999). 
 
                                                 
1 Author is from the INEA (National Institute of Agricultural  Econom-
ics), Rome, Italy (mantino@inea.it).  
 
RESEARCH APPROACH AND THE THEORETICAL MODEL 
This work is based on three basic hypotheses: a) 
that relations between actors and governmental 
level do have a fundamental role in affecting policy 
impacts on the farm system and the territorial con-
text; b) main stakeholders can influence how rules 
and governance structures are designed at the dif-
ferent levels; c) this, in turn, also affects the oppor-
tunities for institutional innovation. This implies 
considering different level of governance (EU, na-
tional/regional, local). In this work four regions have 
been included (Apulia, Sardinia, Tuscany and Ligu-
ria) and, for the local level, five study areas 
(Langhe, Piedmont; Eastern Hills, Friuli; Chianti and 
Garfagnana, Tuscany; S. Daniele area, Friuli). An 
interdisciplinary research team has interviewed 
stakeholders at the different governmental level, 
including national and regional officials, local actors, 
etc. through a semi-structured questionnaire. The 
field work has been complemented by an analysis of 
the more relevant programmes addressed to rural 
areas of each region (RDPs, Operational Pro-
grammes funded by Structural Funds, other relevant 
schemes). 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Policies fail not only when they show spending ineffi-
ciencies, but also when they do not meet the 
planned objectives and are unable to use the rules 
and governance structures which have set up during 
the programming phase. Policy fail in three specific 
conditions: a) very inefficient governance solutions; 
b) poor design of policy measures; c) dominance of 
«extractive» coalitions at local level.  
Very inefficient governance solutions. These circum-
stances are very frequent in programmes which are 
prepared in multi-level context. This is the case of 
RDPs and also Cohesion programmes. Inefficiency is 
produced when the central level is unable to coordi-
nate and animate the lower levels and provide them 
with adequate technical and administrative support. 
Central level here also identifies the regional coordi-
nation. In few cases (Mantino and Forcina, 2011) 
regions were able to set up efficient coordination 
mechanisms with the aim of governing the whole set 
of available policies. Inefficiency also comes when 
there is a contradictory process of devolution to local 
authorities (provinces, mountain communities) from 
the regional level, which does not contribute to 
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strengthen local capacity but only give local a mar-
ginal role. This role has been further limited in the 
most recent years due to the financial crisis (Capo-
rale, 2011). Finally, inefficiency occurs when the 
regulative frame for local development projects (as 
Leader) is designed with the aim of constraining and 
controlling the autonomous strategy of local partner-
ships. 
Poor design of policy measures. Policy measures 
resulted either inefficient or ineffective in several 
cases because of the poor design of selection crite-
ria, eligibility criteria or operational procedures for 
accessing to funds. Policy measures are always de-
signed by public officials under the political approval 
of policy-makers. Both operate under heavy pres-
sures from organisations/associations of farmers or 
other rural actors. Sometimes policy decisions on 
targets, potential beneficiaries, selection and eligibil-
ity criteria generate too many constraints and pro-
cedural burdens which hamper or delay their imple-
mentation rate and effectiveness. This has proved to 
be more frequent for innovative and for non-
agricultural oriented measures, where either con-
servative pressures or simply lack of expertise are 
main reasons of failure.  
Dominance of «extractive» coalitions at local level. 
This condition could be really jeopardising the suc-
cess of local integrated approaches, as in the case of 
Leader projects. Here failure occurs when specific 
local groups dominate the allocation of funds at the 
area level under a logic of patronage and do not 
allow other groups to participate to the construction 
and the management of the integrated local project. 
Under this condition there is scarce social and eco-
nomic innovation and the search for private goods 
prevails upon  searching for local public goods.  
 Every policy reform of rural development is in 
reality carried out in three different phases: 1) the 
preparation of the reform principles in the Regula-
tions; 2) the definition of the policy strategy by 
programmes at national and/or regional level; 3) the 
definition of more operational criteria for applica-
tions’ eligibility and selection by management au-
thorities (figure 1). It is worthy recalling that inno-
vative principles, although introduced by EU Regula-
tions, can be hampered by following policy strategies 
and operational rules. This means that every reform 
might eventually fail when concrete rules are set up, 
because relevant stakeholders oppose strong re-
sistances to the process of reform and institutional 
change. This could happen at every step as illustrat-
ed in figure 1. This figure describe the mechanism of 
interaction between institutions responsible for de-
signing principles, rules, policy strategies and gov-
ernance structures, on the one side, and the stake-
holders’ response on the other side. Stakeholders 
always evaluate the impacts of policy decisions on 
the resource allocation and on transactions costs of 
the policies. When policy decisions have unfavoura-
ble effects on resource allocations or cause too high 
transaction costs (eventually not counterbalanced by 
policy incentives), stakeholders not only raise criti-
cism against policy decision, but also try to pressure 
policy makers and public officials to change. Pres-
sure groups are quite different and promote actions 
in different directions, not always compatible each 
other. The final decision is often a search for media-
tion of different interests. But what it is worthy say-
ing is that mediation could be incompatible with 
innovative rules introduced by the policy reform. 
Beyond policy strategies, rules and governance 
structures prevailing after the stakeholders pres-
sures there are conservative interests that contrib-
ute to the policy failures.    
 
 
 
Figure 1. The mechanism of policy design and implementa-
tion of rural development and the role of stakeholders. 
 
   
 There are specific factors contributing to explain 
why policies fail in the Italian development strategy. 
Some of them are similar to those already outlined 
for Italian Cohesion policies (Barca, 2009), other are 
specific to the rural development experience. This 
work has highlighted five principal critical factors: 1) 
a long term vision of the policy as a tool to fulfil 
fundamental need of public goods; 2) a temporal 
continuity of the policy management and also of the 
staff involved in this management; 3) the quality of 
the human resources within the administrative struc-
tures and local bodies involved in the delivery sys-
tem; 4) the presence of intermediate institutions at 
local level, performing the role as catalyst of devel-
opment processes and promoting cooperation 
among different actors; 5) the presence of networks 
among institutions and private bodies, which are 
capable of going beyond the mere localism. 
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